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Abstract
Quantum-mechanical interpretation-related implications of the theory of uni-
tary premeasurement [1] on complete measurement(objectification or collapse
included) are investigated in the present article with a view to give an af-
firmative answer to the question in the title. It is argued that both Bohr’s
and von Neumann’s ideas lead to those of Everett. Hence, the latter can
be, in some sense, considered to be a continuation and elaboration of both
former approaches. The importance of the idea of relativeness in Everett’s
theory is emphasized. To free the relative-state theory from its roots both
of classicalness and of subjective observation in the argument of this study,
the general or unfolded version of Everett’s theory is sketched.
Keywords: Unitary premeasurement theory, relative states, Everettian many worlds interpretation
The truth about physical objects must be strange. It may be unattain-
able, but if any philosopher believes that he has attained it, the fact that
what he offers as the truth is strange ought not to be made a ground of
objection to his opinion.
Bertrand Russell
1 Introduction
In this study the relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics, initi-
ated by Everett [2], [3] and further developed by De Witt [4], [5] and by
Vaidman [6], [7] (and in the present volume) into the many-worlds theory
(see also [8] and [9]), is approached from a somewhat different angle. (I
made a previous attempt [10] at a relative-state study formally independent
of Everett’s theory.)
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In section 2, a detailed argument is given to the effect that Bohr’s insis-
tence on classicalness of the measuring instruments and von Neumnn’s idea of
subjective observation both can be viewed to lead to Everett’s relative-state
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In section 3 the results of the preceding section are discussed in more
detail (in three subsections). To free the relative-state theory from its pre-
sented roots of classicalness and of subjective observations, which both take
the form of ideal quantum premeasurement, the latter is replaced by general
exact premeasurement in section 4. The generalizations represent ’reading of
the results’ or, equivalently (but sounding more objectively) ’processing the
information in the entanglement’ in the sense of complete measurement.
It turns out that a form of Everett’s formalism is required that is wider
than the usual one. Therefore the formalism is ’unfolded’ in section 5. Section
6 presents 8 final remarks.
The required elements of unitary premeasurement theory are sketched in
Appendix A leaning on relevant previous work [11] and [12].
The contents of this article reads:
2 From Bohr and von Neumann to Everett
3 Discussion
3.1 More on Von Neumann, Bohr and Everett
3.2 ’Relativeness’ and ’absoluteness’
3.3 Critical remarks and possible extensions for remedy
4 The General Case of ’Reading the Result’
5 Unfolding the Formalism of Relative-State Quantum Mechanics
5.1 Relation between relative-state and standard approaches
5.2 Unfolding the relative-state formalism
5.3 Improper mixtures
6 Concluding Remarks
App A Elements of Unitary Premeasurement Theory
App B Proof of equivalence of the partial-scalar product and the partial-
trace relations
App C Generalization from ideal to general exact measurement
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2 From Bohr and Von Neumann to Everett
The usual idea of the so-called paradox of measurement in quantum
mechanics is that, if one forgets about classical physics, one lacks a uni-
tary theory of complete measurement that would answer the following basic
questions, as it is required by experience with quantum measurement:
(i) Question on decoherence How does it come about that the coher-
ence between the terms in the decomposition of the final premeasurement
state vector into complete-measurement terms (cf (A.1) and (A.4a) in Ap-
pendix A) is lost?
(ii) Question on selection How is it possible that the experimenter sees
only one of the terms in the mentioned complete-measurement expansion of
the final premeasurement state vector? (We come back to these questions in
relation (4) in subsection 3.2 .)
Our experience with quantum measurement is not very different from
that with classical measurement. Hence no wonder that the above questions
are put in a classical, or at best, quasi-classical way, expecting quasi-classical
answers (cf relation (4) below), which the quantum formalism cannot give
(cf the no-go theorem of von Neumann [13], last section VI.3 there).
Quasi-classical expectations have often proved no more than a prejudice,
i. e., an obstacle that we ourselves put unwittingly in the way of progress.
Having in mind this warning, we generalize the questions allowing the quan-
tum formalism to find, possibly, its own answers.
The generalized questions.
(i) Decoherence Can the quantum formalism furnish decoherence of the
complete-measurement results at the end of measurement in some way?
(ii) Selection If the answer to question (i) is affirmative, how does se-
lection of one complete-measurement result in the case of individual systems
come about?
The quantum-mechanical formalism is not derived from some more fun-
damental principles; it comes from experience. Hence it is reasonable to
follow Niels Bohr and take into account the experimental fact that the
macroscopic, classical measuring instruments obey classical laws.
In particular, this immediately converts premeasurement theory into com-
plete measurement.
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This point has been repeatedly emphasized in the literature, see e. g. the
first passage of the last chapter of the book on quantum mechanics by Asher
Peres [14]. He introduced the catchy term ’dequantization’.
To obtain a rough idea of dequantization, one must realize that once the
’pointer positions’ {F kB : ∀k} (cf Appendix A) are classical events, then
the basic law of classical events is valid for them. It claims that for any
sum of disjoint events like
∑
k F
k
B = IB that amounts to the certain event
IB precisely one of the event terms is bound to occur on the individual
system.
We can translate back this classical view into quantum mechanics, or
to ’requantize’ it (to use a term inspired by the mentioned ideas of Peres).
Quantum occurrence takes place in measurement; classical happening does
not. But since classical ideal measurement does not change the state at all,
we can assume that the latter undergoes classical ideal measurement.
This is best translated into quantum mechanics by taking resort to
quantum-mechanical ideal premeasurement , which at least does not
change the state when the initial state has a sharp values of the measured
observable (cf (A.6c)).
On the other hand, in our search to find answers to the above questions,
we can study the case of an arbitrary premeasurement, followed by ’reading’
the result on part of a sentient being, which we denote as subsystem C. This
means taking a von Neumann chain of two links. Let ti < t
f
1 be the
initial moment and the final moment of the first premeasurement. The latter
is at the same time the initial moment of the second premeasurement. Let
tf2
(
> tf1
)
be the final moment of the second premeasurement.
We have here an example of von Neumann’s psycho-physical parallelism
[13] (cf p. 421 in section 1. of chapter VI and p. 440 in the middle of section
3. of chapter VI there) claiming that one can arbitrarily choose which system
will be the subject in a von Neumann chain. In our example it is subsystem
C.
As it was stated, ’reading’ the pointer observable on the measuring in-
strument on part of the experimenter (subsystem C) can be considered as a
classical ideal measurement, which does not change any state. It quantum-
mechanically becomes ideal quantum-mechanical premeasurement because
the latter is the kind of quantum premeasurement that is closest to the for-
mer. Hence, we take for the second link ideal premeasurement . We
express this in more detail.
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Let
|Φ〉fAB = U(t
f
1 − ti)AB
(
|φ〉iA |φ, ti〉B
)
=
∑
k
F kB |Φ〉
f
AB (1)
be the final state of the first premeasurement, i. e., the first link in the chain.
Here U(tf1 − ti)AB is the unitary evolution operator of the measurement
(which includes the object-measuring-instrument interaction), |φ〉iA is the
initial state of the object, and |φ, ti〉B is the initial or ”ready-to-measure”
state of the instrument. The decomposition into complete-measurement
terms in the last expression is obtained utilizing the completeness relation∑
k F
k
B = IB , where IB is the identity operator for the instrument. (If the
reader has difficulty with the notations, perhaps he should read Appendix A
first.)
The second premeasurement ’reads’ the first-premeasurement result. As
it has been explained above, it is an ideal premeasurement . It is the pointer
observable PB =
∑
k pkF
k
B of the first premeasurement that is the measured
observable in it.
As to the second link, we utilize the fact that, according to relation (A.6a),
ideal premeasurement leaves unchanged each of the selective components
F kB |Φ〉
f
AB in expansion (1), but it multiplies tensorically each of them with
a different new ’pointr position’ state |φ, tf2〉
k
C . These states are orthogonal
to each other. Altogether,
|Ψ〉fABC = U(t
f
2 − t
f
1)ABC
(
|Φ〉fAB |φ, t
f
1〉
i
C
)
=
∑
k
F kB |Φ〉
f
AB⊗ |φ, t
f
2〉
k
C. (2)
Next, we evaluate a relevant decomposition of the final subsystem state
ρfAB ≡ trC
(
|Ψ〉fABC〈Ψ |
f
ABC
)
, where ”trC” denotes the partial trace over
subsystem C. We turn to the general quantum formalism and do this with
the help of an auxiliary claim, which we supply with physical meaning in
the standard (Copenhagen) way:
Let |Ψ〉12 be any bipartite state vector, and {| n〉2 : ∀n} a complete
orthonormal basis for the second subsystem. Let, further,
|Ψ〉12 =
∑
n
|n〉1 |n〉2 (aux− 1)
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be the expansion of the former in the latter. (If unfamiliar with expansion in
a subsystem basis, cf section 2 in [15].) The ’expansion coefficients’ {|n〉1 :
∀n} are vectors in the state space of the opposite subsystem. They are not
necessarily unit vectors (to indicate this, they are written overlined).
Then, one immediately obtains
ρ1 ≡ tr2
(
|Ψ〉12〈Ψ |12
)
=
∑
n
|||n〉1||
2 ×
(
|n〉1
/
|||n〉1||
)(
〈n |1
/
|||n〉1||
)
. (aux− 2)
It is an improper mixture [16] (subsection 7.2 there). The statistical
weights {|||n〉1||
2 : ∀n} in it are the probabilities of the ’occurrences’ of
the corresponding events {| n〉2〈n |2: ∀n} in the composite state |Ψ〉12 .
The pure states
∀n : |n〉1
/
|||n〉1|| (aux− 3)
are the ’conditional states’ for which the corresponding conditions are
the ’occurrences’ of the corresponding events {|n〉2〈n |2: ∀n} in |Ψ〉12 .
In order to return to our case given by relation (2), we note that our
subsystems are A+B (subsystem 1) and C (subsystem 2). We can complete,
if necessary, the sub-basis {| φ, tf2〉
k
C : ∀k} into a basis for subsystem C in
an arbitrary way. Relation (2) is the expansion of our bipartite state in this
basis. (The coefficients along the basis vectors that are joined to the former
sub-basis are all zero.)
One can see now that application of the general auxiliary decomposition
(aux-1-aux-3)to the composite-system state given by (2) gives:
ρAB ≡ trC
(
|Ψ〉fABC〈Ψ |
f
ABC
)
=
∑
k
||F kB |Φ, t
f
1〉AB||
2×
(
F kB |Φ, t
f
1〉AB
/
||F kB |Φ, t
f
1〉AB||
)(
〈Φ, tf1 |AB F
k
B
/
||F kB |Φ, t
f
1〉AB||
)
. (3)
The improper mixture (3) can provide us with answers to the two gen-
eralized questions aimed at complete measurements above if we make two
stipulations.
(a) The experimenter or observer is quantum-mechanically just a measur-
ing instrument with the relevant contents of his consciousness as the ’pointer
positions’ F kC . Hence, relation (2) is the relevant all-encompassing state.
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(b) We do not stick to the idea of ’absoluteness’ in quantum-mechanical
description, and allow for ’relativeness’. This is due to the above conditional
states, which have physical meaning relative to the above conditions.
It is noteworthy that the first two ’questions’ at the beginning of the sec-
tion were stated with the underlying idea of ’absoluteness’ suggested by the
quasi-classical approach (cf relation (4) below in subsection 3.2). One should
also note that we are dealing with ’relativeness’ in non-relativistic quantum
mechanics.
The quantum-mechanical formalism, as it has been developed so far, sug-
gests the following answer to the generalized questions.
(i) We have seen in (3) that relative to subsystem A+B of the ob-
ject (A) plus first measuring instrument (B), the coherence has disappeared;
decoherence has set in.
(ii) If we define a measurement result in the first premeasurement rela-
tive to the second measuring instrument (subsystem C, the experimenter)
plus one of its ’pointer positions’ F k¯C =|φ, t
f
2〉
k¯
C〈φ, t
f
2 |
k¯
C (the contents of the
consciousness of the experimenter observing the result of the first premea-
surement ), then we do have complete measurement.
Our ’relative answers’ are precisely what Everett has brought as novelty
into the interpretation of quantum mechanics [2], [3]. His approach differs
from the standard, i. e., Copenhagen one in several aspects. The conditional
states are, according to Everett, relative states; and they are not ’on con-
dition that the event |n〉2〈n|2 occurs’ (see the auxiliary claim above), but,
instead, they are ’in relation to the state |n〉2 ’. These may be viewed
as semantic differences.
Where Everett differs most and substantially from the Copenhagen view
is in the assertion that the premeasurement final state vector |Ψ〉fABC
’remains fully preserved’ in complete measurement. The ’relative-
ness’ in the approach makes this possible.
3 Discussion
Everett’s approach to complete measurement, as we have obtained it in the
preceding section, requires critical examination. We have not derived ’rela-
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tiveness’ and Everett’s view from unitary quantum premeasurement theory;
we have only recognized that it is a possible answer to the generalized ques-
tions concerning complete measurement.
What is left open? We certainly cannot get answers as expected in the
formulation of the traditional, quasi-classical questions. Logically it is pos-
sible that some new insight might get answers to the generalized questions
differing from the Everettian ones. I do not think that this is likely to hap-
pen, not within unitary dynamics. (See also concluding remark (ii) in the
last section.)
It seems desirable to relate our conclusions in the preceding section to
known facts and opinions from the literature.
3.1 More on Von Neumann, Bohr and Everett
Von Neumann (or the ’orthodox interpretation’ of quantum mechanics as con-
trasted with the Copenhagen one) applies the projection postulate besides
unitary theory, projecting out all but one complete-measurement component
F k¯B |Φ〉
f
AB
/
||F k¯B |Φ〉
f
AB|| of the final premeasurement state vector |Φ〉
f
AB
(cf (1)). He called it ”process one”, whereas the unitary evolution was ”pro-
cess two”. But, it was Niels Bohr who played the most outstanding role in
viewing quantum mechanics in the framework of ’absoluteness’.
I’ll argue that Bohr (the father of the Copenhagen interpretation) and
Everett need not be considered as violently conflicting views. For
a start, I turn to Shimony’s incisive analysis of Bohr [17] (pp.769 and 770
there).
”I suspect that Bohr was aware of the difficulties inherent in a macroscop-
ical ontology, and in his most careful writing he states subtle qualifications
concerning states of macroscopic objects. For example” [18]
”The main point here is the distinction between the objects un-
der investigation and the measuring instruments which serve to
define, in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenom-
ena appear. Incidentally, we remark that, for the illustration of
the preceding considerations, it is not relevant that experiments
involving an accurate control of the momentum or energy transfer
8
from atomic particles to heavy bodies like diaphragms and shut-
ters would be very difficult to perform, if practicable at all. It
is only decisive that, in contrast to the proper measuring instru-
ments, these bodies together with the particles would constitute
the system to which the quantum-mechanical formalism has to
be applied.”
Shimony further comments: ”Bohr is saying that from one point of view
the apparatus is described classically and from another, mutually exclusive
point of view, it is described quantum-mechanically. In other words, he is
applying the principle of complementarity, which was originally formulated
for microscopical phenomena, to a macroscopic piece of apparatus. ...”
It seems to me that in Bohr’s macroscopic complementarity principle (as
we perhaps may call it following Shimony’s discussion) there is concealed
an important implication. If the quantum-mechanical formalism can be ap-
plied to ”bodies” like diaphragms and shutters, then it can, most likely, be
applied to all classical systems. But then, clearly, Bohr admits that macro-
scopic systems, usually described classically, can be described also quantum-
mechanically. This opens up the alley of treating the macroscopic objects on
the same footing as the microscopic ones (cf [19], [20], [21]).
Thus, seeds of Everett’s approach, who assumed that there is no limit
to the applicability of quantum mechanics, are present already in the ”most
careful writing” of Bohr (as Shimony puts it).
As it was stated, Everett’s most provocative claim for the adherents to
the Copenhagen interpretation is the claim that the final state |Φ〉fAB does
not split up into the final complete-measurement components abolishing co-
herence (more on this in subsection 3.2 and relation (4)). Decoherence in the
subsystem A+B, with preservation of coherence in the larger, comprehending
system A+B+C in the state | Ψ, tf2〉ABC , is, surprisingly or not, in some
way, furnished by unitary theory (in the preceding section), which appears
to be in no actual conflict with the Copenhagen view of quantum mechanics.
One should note that elevation of the coherence by interaction to the
larger, comprehending system (ABC in (2)) accompanied by decoherence in
the subsystem (A+B) (cf (3)) is an important fundamental theoretical fact
inherent in von Neumann’s writings [13], emphasized in [22], and discussed
in my previous work [20].
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It seems to me that the crucial point in comparing Bohr and Everett is
seeking answer to the question if ’survival’ of the other branches, complete-
measurement components, in which the experimenter does not find himself,
has any physical meaning. I suspect that it does.
We have reached Everett’s view by stipulating that a sentient observer is
not different from an inanimate measuring instrument as far as the quantum
formalism is concerned. Analogously, the formalism makes no distinction
between small, microscopic systems and large macroscopic, classical ones.
Let us take a microscopic example.
Suppose we measure the spin projection of a spin-one-half particle in the
Stern-Gerlach (SG) measuring instrument (the spin tensor-factor space of
the particle is the object subsystem A). Let us forget about the screen for a
moment. Spin projection and moving into the upper or lower half-space in
the SG magnetic field satisfy the calibration condition (cf Appendix A): if
spin is ’up’, the particle moves upwards,if spin is ’down’, the particle moves
downwards. Thus, the orbital (spatial) tensor factor in the state vector of
the particle in the magnetic field fully qualifies as a measuring instrument in
the formalism (subsystem B), and the final premeasurement state |Φ, tf1〉AB
is the state vector of the particle when leaving the SG magnetic field (before
it hits the screen).
Does one of the upper-half-space and lower-half-space components of this
final state disappear in the field? The quantum formalism implies and we
have reason to believe that the disappearance of one of the components does
not take place earlier than when the particle hits the screen. This is confirmed
by the relevant analogous neutron interference experiments, e. g., [23].
When the particle in the magnetic field of the Stern-Gerlach measuring
instrument hits the screen, only one of the two final complete-measurement
components is observed. The other component seems to vanish completely.
This fact, and the same phenomenon in numerous variations of concrete mea-
surements, have puzzled and haunted many great thinkers in physics. This
is the core of the paradox of quantum measurement theory. No wonder that
von Neumann and essentially also Bohr discarded by postulate all but the
observed final complete-measurement component (one term in the mixture
(3)). It came as a reasonable, but essentially phenomenological, postulate.
Their attitude was within the framework of ’absoluteness’. There appeared
to be no alternative.
Everett payed a high price in personal suffering [24] [25] for not taking
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the reasonable path. Instead, he followed consistently the quantum formal-
ism (perhaps believing blindly that it contains the underlying quantum laws
of nature). Thus he found the obvious alternative within the frame of ’rela-
tiveness’.
Returning to the Stern-Gerlach measurement, before the particle reaches
the screen, we have the final state |Φ, tf1〉AB of the first premeasurement,
consisting of the mentioned two terms. The spot on the screen is the result
of the second measurement, which is a complete one.
In the Everettian view, the first premeasurement took place in the labora-
tory, i. e. the experimenter was faced with the mentioned coherent mixture
of complete results analogously as ’Wigner’ was in relation to his ’friend’ in
the famous paradox of ’Wigner’s friend’ [26]. This changes drastically in
the second premeasurement , when the experimenter, all his macroscopic de-
vices and the whole laboratory, join one of the former complete-measurement
components.
In the Everettian view, the drastic change takes place when the conscious-
ness of the experimenter becomes one of the states |φ, tf2〉
k¯
C for a fixed value
k¯ in the expansion (2). Then the consciousness, together with the entire
body of the experimenter, even the whole laboratory and its surroundings,
acquire a double identity: they still are a tensor factor in the tensor product
of different subsystems (preserving their basic physical identity), and they
belong now to an Everettian branch (denoted by k¯ for instance). The other
final complete-measurement components do not disappear; they are just not
present in the branch corresponding to k¯ .
In the Copenhagen approach one emphasizes the difference between macro-
scopic and microscopic. It is only the former where classical physics, which
lacks the very notion of coherence, can be applied.
In the Everettian approach one would say that, on account of the com-
plexity of macroscopic objects, it is hard, but, in principle, not impossible
to see interference of two or more complete-measurement components in the
laboratory.
The present author is inclined to consider the possibility that the Ev-
erettian approach might be a successor of and improvement on the
Copenhagen approach. Future results will tell.
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3.2 ’Relativeness’ and ’absoluteness’
To avoid the term ’relativity’, which is somehow reserved for Einstein’s spe-
cial and general relativities, the term ’relativeness’ is used in this article for
relative concepts within non-relativistic quantum mechanics. ’Absoluteness’
is used as the negation of ’relativeness’.
Classical physics is permeated with the hidden idea of ’absoluteness’. It
is hidden because in classical physics there is no alternative; it is self-evident.
It seems to me that a simple definition of ’absolute’ goes as follows.
Let us have a physical system A, and let us make a physical statement
about it. Further, let B be another physical system having no overlap with
A. The larger system A+B contains A as a subsystem. If we can refute the
mentioned statement in A+B, then it is not absolute; it is valid only relative
to subsystem A. If, on the other hand, it is true that for every subsystem B
the statement is equivalently valid in A+B, then it is valid in an absolute
sense.
In the particular example of ’state’ of a system A, classically, a state is
either pure or mixed, and this cannot be proved false in any larger system
containing A; it is an absolute statement. I believe, nobody says so, because
all physical statements are such in classical physics. What is more, one might
formulate the classical criterion that a physical statement is true only if it is
equivalently valid in every larger system containing the initial one.
In quantum mechanics we have proper and improper mixtures [16] (sub-
section 7.2 there). This is an important case where the distinction between
’absoluteness’ and ’relativeness’ appears.
Let us start with absoluteness. The formulation of the quasi-classical
questions concerning complete measurement (cf beginning of section 2) was
in hope of a quasi-classical answer that would, in view of the coherence of
the terms in expansion (1), read
|Φ〉fAB → ρ
f
AB ≡
∑
k
〈φ |iA E
k
A |φ〉
i
A ×
(
F kB |Φ〉
f
AB
/
||F kB |Φ〉
f
AB||
)(
〈Φ |fAB F
k
B
/
||F kB |Φ〉
f
AB||
)
(4)
to obtain the relevant mixture of complete-measurement final states. It is
called a proper mixture.
We are concerned with the ’absoluteness’ of the proper mixture (4). If we
consider a larger system by joining any other system C in some state ρC ,
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then the transition from premeasurement to complete measurement is
(
|Φ〉fAB〈Φ |
f
AB
)
⊗ ρC → ρ
f
AB ⊗ ρC ,
and subsequent evaluation of the final complete-measurement AB-subsystem
state brings us obviously back to ρfAB in (4). The point is, of course, the
lack of entanglement between AB and C.
Contrariwise, if we have another measurement (for instance, an ideal one
as we had so far), then suitable entanglement is created between subsystems
AB and C, and a decomposition identical to (3), but this time with a mean-
ing relative to subsystem AB only (and the terms having meaning relative
to the distinct pointer positions of FC ) comes about. We thus obtain a
so-called improper mixture [16] (subsection 7.2 there) with the described
relativeness.
Let me close this section with a short story, which might appear naive at
first glance; but actually it is profound. A boy is standing on the riverbank.
Somebody is shouting to him from the opposite bank: ”Boy, how can I go
to the other bank?” ”You fool” - answers the boy, ”You are already on the
other bank.”
When the boy grows up, he will realize that ”this side” and ”the other
side” are relative concepts in relation to the speaker. It could be that Ev-
erett’s ideas are prompting us to grow up in comprehending quantum me-
chanics.
3.3 Critical remarks and possible extensions
for remedy
Let us start this subsection with some critical remarks.
The tacit assumption that the system A+B (object plus measuring in-
strument) can be dynamically isolated from its surroundings during premea-
surement (from ti till t
f
1 ), may raise suspicion; in reality it might be
illusionary. So is the underlying tacit assumption of statistical isolation, i.
e., that the subsystems considered have not interacted with the surroundings
in the past, so that there are no statistical correlations between the former
and the latter or that in preparation such correlations, if they existed, could
have been destroyed.
13
The preparator may play an important role in achieving pure-state ob-
jects and pure initial states of the measuring instrument. These states can
be conditional states, in the standard language of Copenhagen, the condi-
tions being some events on the preparator, or relative states relative to some
preparator and events in the terminology of Everett.
One wonders if there is hope of improvement. In the entire unitary the-
ory of quantum premeasurement (cf the review [11]) the very definition of
subsystem B is to some extent incomplete. Subsystem B can contain parts
that have no connection with the process of premeasurement .
Taking into account the above critical thoughts, we may try to improve
the theory. But first, a finer analysis is required.
We start with the fact that in macroscopic measuring devices usually only
a part (a subsystem) performs the premeasurement . Hence, we may view
the instrument B as consisting of two disjoint parts, B = B1 + B2 , where
only B1 takes part in the measuring process. ( B2 may interact with the
object A and with B1 , but it is irrelevant for the premeasurement .) We
may define B1 to be minimal, i. e., so that the pointer observable, as an
operator, is actually acting in the state space of subsystem B1 , and not in
the state space of any subsystem of B1 . In other words, B2 is the largest
’passive’ part of B (meaning ’relative to premeasurement’).
In our description of premeasurement , subsystem B2 need not be con-
fined to part of the actual measuring device; it may encompass a part of
the surroundings; actually, as much of it as it takes to invalidate the above
critical remarks on dynamical and correlational isolation.
In view of the fact that all bodies in the universe seem to interact all the
time with each other, the safest thing may be including all the rest of the
world in B2 . We will see in the next section what this means in more detail.
4 The General Case of ’Reading the Result’
It seems reasonable to investigate if, within the unitary formalism of quan-
tum mechanics, ideal premeasurement is replaceable by general exact pre-
measurement. Namely, in quantum premeasurement theory the former is
often a springboard for the latter (cf e. g. [12]); one may suspect that ideal
premeasurement is not endowed with an important universal role.
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If the second premeasurement in the two-link von Neumann chain that
we have discussed in section 2 is not an ideal premeasurement, then we lack
a sub-basis the elements of which are distinguished by distinct pointer posi-
tions, referring to different results, which led to an Everettian interpretation
in a simple way.
We have made the stipulation that the living observer is, as far as mea-
surement theory in quantum mechanics is concerned, just a measuring instru-
ment (subsystem C). As a consequence, we have seen that his measurement-
theoretic ’processing’ of the information contained in the quantum correla-
tions created by the second premeasurement led to decoherence in the sub-
system state ρAB and to complete measurement in a relative sense (cf
relation (3)). (This ”processing” was previously called subjectively ”reading
the result”.)
The question arises if every second exact premeasurement can, analo-
gously, process the relevant measurement-theoretic information from the en-
tanglement that came about in the second premeasurement .
We again turn to the quantum formalism for an affirmative answer. One
has the following relevant general auxiliary claim.
Let ρ12 be a general composite state (density operator), and let
∑
n P
n
2 =
I2 be an arbitrary (finite or infinite) decomposition of the identity, i. e.,
an orthogonal sum of projectors adding up to the identity operator, for
subsystem 2. Then, the first-subsystem state (reduced density operator)
ρ1 ≡ tr2ρ12 can be written in a decomposed form as follows:
ρ1 =
∑
n
wnρ
n
1 , (AUX − a)
where
∀n : wn ≡ tr(ρ12P
n
2 ), (AUX − b)
and
∀n, wn > 0 : ρ
n
1 ≡ tr2(ρ12P
n
2 )
/
tr(ρ12P
n
2 ). (AUX − c)
Proof One can write
ρ1 ≡ tr2ρ12 =
∑
n
tr2(ρ12P
n
2 ),
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from which the claimed decomposition AUX-a with the relations AUX-b and
AUX-c immediately follows. This ends the proof.
Physical meaning of the entities in the standard (non-Everettian) sense:
The decomposition (AUX-a)-(AUX-c) itself appears to be a mixture. The
statistical weights {wn : ∀n} are the probabilities of occurrence of the
corresponding events {P n2 : ∀n} in the state ρ12 .
Each subsystem state {ρn1 : ∀n} is the conditional state correspond-
ing to the condition that the event P n2 occurs in the state ρ12 . Namely,
utilizing idempotency and under-the-partial trace commutativity (cf (A.7)),
one can rewrite (AUX-c) as
∀n, wn > 0 : ρ
n
1 = tr2(P
n
2 ρ12P
n
2 )
/
tr(P n2 ρ12P
n
2 ). (AUX − d)
An event P n2 ’occurs’ in quantum mechanics in complete measurement
of the observable P n2 = 1 × P
n
2 + 0 × (P
n
2 )
c (( P n2 )
c is the complemen-
tary event) corresponding to the result 1 (and one shortly says ’P n2 is
measured’). At first glance, as one can see in relation (AUX-d), the pre-
measurement in question is an ideal one (cf (A.6b)). But, if one takes into
account the result obtained in [12], which says that as far as the effect on the
opposite subsystem is concerned, all premeasurements have the same effect
as ideal premeasurement , then it is clear that the kind of premeasurement
is immaterial. (In the mentioned reference the claim was proved only for
pure composite-system states. But it is easily generalized into the analogous
claim for general states - cf beginning of Appendix C.)
We can utilize the auxiliary general claim to answer the question of pro-
cessing the relevant information as follows. Our composite state is |Ψ〉fABC
(cf (2)), and it is the completeness relation
∑
k F
k
C = IC , accompanying
the pointer observable PC =
∑
k p
′
kF
k
C , that is the relevant decomposition
of the identity. Relation (AUX-a) then becomes
ρfAB ≡ trC
(
|Ψ〉fABC〈Ψ |
f
ABC
)
=
∑
k
〈φ |iA E
k
A |φ〉
i
A × ρ
f,k
AB (5a)
(cf (2) and (A.4a)), where, due to (AUX-c), ∀k, 〈φ |iA E
k
A |φ〉
i
A > 0:
ρf,kAB ≡ trC
(
|Ψ〉fABC〈Ψ |
f
ABC F
k
C
)/[
tr
(
|Ψ〉fABC〈Ψ |
f
ABC F
k
C
)]
. (5b)
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Since we have a pure state |Ψ〉ABC of the larger comprehending system,
(5a) cannot be an ordinary, i. e., absolute mixture, and therefore (5a) is an
improper mixture.
Applying the idea of ’relativeness’, we can say that the mixture in (5a),
which displays decoherence, is valid relative to subsystem AB, and that, for
∀k, 〈φ |iA E
k
A | φ〉
i
A > 0 , the subsystem state ρ
f,k
AB is the state relative
to the event (’pointer position’) F kC in the (unchanged) composite-system
state |Ψ〉ABC .
We have thus obtained a relative-state physical meaning of the pro-
cessing of the entanglement between subsystems A + B and C in the
final state | Ψ〉fABC in the spirit of Everettian ideas. Subsystem C thus
”reads” the measurement results in the first premeasurement.
One should note that the described processing of relevant information
brings us back to von Neumnann’s psycho-physical parallelism (cf section 2)
with an arbitrary (subjective) cut between object and subject. In (5a) the
object of physical description is subsystem A + B . The first measuring
instrument with the ’pointer positions’ {F kB : ∀k} belongs to the object of
physical description.
We return now to the last point in the preceding subsection, where A+
B1+B2 constituted the entire world on account of a suitable broadening of
B2 . In the final premeasurement state vector |Φ〉fAB (cf(1)) we substitute
B1 +B2 for B , and we evaluate the conditional (or relative) states
∀k : ρf,kAB2 ≡ trB1
(
|Φ〉fAB1B2〈Φ|
f
AB1B2
F kB1
)/
tr
(
|Φ〉fAB1B2〈Φ|
f
AB1B2
F kB1
)
. (6)
To discuss (6), let us take two extreme cases.
(i) If there is no entanglement between A + B2 and B1 , then the
tripartite state vector tensor-factorizes into the state vector of subsystem
(A + B2) and that of B1 . As a consequence, for all k values (for all
branches) subsystem A+B2 is in one and the same state as one can easily
see in (6).
(ii) Contrariwise, if the entanglement between B1 and A + B2 is
strongly dependent on the pointer positions F kB1 (which can be the ver-
batim pointer positions or the consciousness of the observer), then we have
different state vectors for the entire world. This brings us to De Witt’s con-
troversial many worlds [4], [5]. They are in our description the conditional
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states (relative states) of subsystem A + B2 corresponding to the distinct
pointer positions F kB1 .
5 Unfolding the Relative-State Formalism
One may wonder if the answer in terms of relative states in relation to
events for another system, obtained in the preceding section, is still within
the conceptual confines of the Everettian approach. My answer is affirma-
tive. This section is devoted to an explanation of this claim.
The general ’processing of the relevant information’ or ’reading the re-
sult’ expounded in the preceding section gives motivation for discussing the
Everettian formalism in more detail.
Everett himself in his relative-state quantum mechanics (RSQM) [2],
[3] used mostly states in relation to states of another subsystem. I believe
this is the folded version of his approach. It can be unfolded in a straight-
forward way as it will be shown in the following subsections. ’Unfolding’
is a generalization in which the ’folded’ special case implies, i. e., uniquely
determines, the generalization, which is then the ’unfolded’ version.
5.1 Relation between relative-state and standard ap-
proaches
The ’folded’ version of RSQM has three equivalent forms. In the first, the
relative state | φ〉A of the object that corresponds to the subject state
| φ〉B in a pure composite state | Ψ〉AB is evaluated by the procedure
used originally by Everett [2], [3]. It is the normalized ’expansion coefficient’
multiplying in a tensorial way | φ〉B in the expansion of | Ψ〉AB in any
basis of subsystem B containing |φ〉B (cf aux-1-aux-3 in section 2).
In the second form no subsystem basis is required. One just multiplies
|Ψ〉AB from the left by the bra of | φ〉B in a partial scalar product, and
then one performs normalization. The equivalence of the first two forms is
trivial (cf, if desired, section 2 in [15]).
Finally, in the third form the procedure is further varied, and the par-
tial scalar product is replaced by a suitable partial trace according to the
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following equivalence:
|φ〉A = 〈φ |B|Ψ〉AB
/
[〈Ψ |AB (|φ〉B〈φ |B) |Ψ〉AB]
1/2 ⇔
|φ〉A〈φ |A= trB[(|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB)(|φ〉B〈φ |B)]
/
{tr[(|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB)(|φ〉B〈φ |B)]}. (7)
(Naturally, the implication ”⇐” is ’up to an arbitrary phase factor’.) For
the reader’s convenience, equivalence (7) is proved in Appendix B.
Now we focus attention on the relation between RSQM and the standard
approach. By the latter is meant the simplified, text-book version of the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Following relation (aux-d) in section 2, one can rewrite the partial-trace
relation in (7) as follows:
|φ〉A〈φ |A=
trB
[(
|φ〉B〈φ |B
)(
|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB
)(
|φ〉B〈φ |B
)]/
{
tr
[(
|φ〉B〈φ |B
)(
|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB
)(
|φ〉B〈φ |B
)]}
. (8)
In the standard approach LHS(8) is the conditional state of subsystem
A that is given rise to by the occurrence of the opposite-subsystem event
|φ〉B〈φ |B in the bipartite state |Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB in ideal premeasurement (cf
relation (19b) in [12]).
This is the connection between RSQM and the standard approach. They
describe the same physical process, the complete ideal measurement of the
event |φ〉B〈φ |B , in different terms.
As it was stated before (cf end of section 2), but it is worth repeat-
ing, it is the premeasurement of the same event (as an observable) in the
same composite-system state where the two approaches disagree. The stan-
dard approach, guided by the classical idea of ’occurrence’, discards all other
complete-measurement final components; whereas RSQM leaves the entire
final state of premeasurement unchanged.
One should note that in RSQM there is no ’occurrence’ of events (no
collapse). An event plays the role of a subject entity in relation to which
the relative state |φ〉A is, in a subjective way, considered.
Incidentally, the first form of RSQM, the one most favored by Everett
himself, perhaps inspired by von Neumann’s maximal overmeasurement of
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each observable, also the observable |φ〉B〈φ |B is maximally overmeasured
in premeasurement. This may lead to infinitely many complete-measurement
final components, or, equivalently in the language of mathematics, to in-
finitely many expansions of the composite state in a subsystem basis.
5.2 Unfolding the relative-state formalism
Having established that it is relation (8) where the two approaches coincide
(though using different terms), unique generalization in the quantum formal-
ism is well known. If ρAB is any density operator for the composite system
with the physical meaning of a proper mixture (cf subsection 3.2), and PB
denotes an arbitrary event (projector) for subsystem B, then the well-known
unique generalization of (8) is
ρA = trB
(
PBρABPB
)/
tr
(
ρABPB
)
(9a)
[27], [28], [29]. For the sake of completeness, this is proved in Appendix C.
In the standard approach, (9a) defines the conditional state of subsystem
A due to the occurrence of the event PB on the opposite subsystem in the
composite-system state ρAB in ideal premeasurement of PB . In RSQM
(9a) determines the relative state of the object subsystem A in relation to
the subject event PB of the opposite subsystem in the composite-system
state ρAB .
Going back to the equivalence of relations (AUX-d) and (AUX-c) in sec-
tion 4, we see that (9a) can be written in the equivalent form:
ρA = trB
(
ρABPB
)/
tr
(
ρABPB
)
. (9b)
This is where the unfolded RSQM gives the same relation as the one we have
obtained in the preceding section in our analysis of premeasurement in (6).
The composite-system state was pure there; it was the final state | Φ〉fAB
of premeasurement, but the subject event was a general event, a ’pointer
position’ F kB .
5.3 Improper mixtures
Perhaps it is not superfluous to show that relations (9a) and (9b) are valid
also for improper mixtures ρAB .
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We assume that we have a general (mixed or pure) state ρAB
(
≡
trCρABC
)
of a subsystem AB of a tripartite composite system ABC. We
assume that the state ρABC is pure or a proper mixture.
We want to evaluate the relative state ρA of the first subsystem, which
we choose to be our object subsystem. For the subject subsystem we
take subsystem B. Finally, we assume that an event (projector) PB on the
subject subsystem is given for the subject event. The subject subsystem
and its subject event together constitute the subject entity.
We can take subsystem B+C as the subject subsystem with PB as its
subject event in an intermediate step. Then the evaluation of the relative
state, according to (9b), goes as follows:
ρA = trBC
(
ρABCPB
)/
tr
(
ρABCPB
)
or, equivalently (as easily seen)
ρA = trB
(
ρABPB
)/
tr
(
ρABPB
)
, (10a)
where
ρAB ≡ trC(ρABC) (10b)
is the subsystem state (reduced density operator) of the A+B subsystem.
ρAB is a subsystem state, possibly an improper mixture. Relation (10a),
defining the relative state ρA , is not different from (9b) that is valid for
proper mixtures or pure states. This is consistent with the well-known fact
that proper and improper mixtures are equally described in quantum me-
chanics.
6 Concluding Remarks
(i) Though this investigation has not actually derived the Everettian relative-
state interpretation from unitary premeasurement theory, it has lent sup-
port to it.
(ii) One may also argue as follows. If one formulates a principle of im-
possibility (analogous to that in thermodynamics) that one cannot find any
other answer to the generalized questions in section 2 than the one presented
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in section 2, and if the principle would be widely accepted, then the Ev-
erettian relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics could be based
on it (as the basic laws of thermodynamics are based on the principles of
impossibility to create energy out of nothing and to extract work out of heat
at a fixed temperature).
(iii) When I was analyzing a fascinating thought experiment [20], [30]
and an even more inspiring real experiment [21], [31], both realizing tran-
sition through one of two slits and interference through them in the same
experiment (and other wonders), I found that the relative-state approach
gave an in-depth physical view. But as long as one is confined to analyzing an
experiment, one can enjoy the advantages of relative states without having
to worry about parallel worlds. I called it ’pocket addition’ of the Everett
theory.
In discussion with professor Dieter Zeh it became clear to me that if
one assumes with Everett that there is no limit to the validity of quantum
mechanics, i. e.,, that it is universally valid, then the many-worlds interpre-
tation has no alternative in the approach.
(iv) Authors of entertaining films [32] or television series caught on the
idea of parallel worlds. In an episode of the television series Stargate the main
character Sam Carter meets her replicas from parallel worlds as a person from
Europe meets one from America. In a film I saw that meeting a replica led
to explosive disappearance of both.
These ideas are false, but understandable because a coherent sum of quan-
tum components (as (1) or (2)) has no parallel in the classical world. Two
components can be united into one, and the new state may be very different
from both former components. (One should only think of the well-known
two-slit interference pattern.)
(v) The reader may wonder why stick to unitary dynamics when there
are other ways to complete premeasurement (some of them presented in this
volume). I admit that it is a hypothesis, a conviction, an act of faith. (Read
perhaps my unpublished essay [33] and Schlosshower’s scholarly study [34].)
The natural conceptual framework for Newtonian mechanics is the three-
dimensional real space and the one-dimensional real time axis. This ’natu-
ralness’ is, of course, imprinted onto us biologically: our classical intuition
’feels’ it.
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Some of us believe that the complex Hilbert space with its unitary metrics,
the state space, is the natural conceptual framework of quantum mechanics.
But it is not impressed on us by the still lacking quantum intuition. Uni-
tary operators are isometries of the state space, and thus the unique way
to formulate changes in the state space. On the other hand, unitary evolu-
tion operators are the integral equivalents of the famous (and elementary)
Schro¨dinger equation.
(vi) Bell has disproved [35] von Neumann (physically, not mathemati-
cally): von Neumann’s no-hidden-variables no-go theorem [13] (chapter IV,
section 2 there). Similarly, Everett has disproved von Neumann’s famous
claim that process 1 (complete measurement) cannot follow from process 2
(premeasurement) within unitary dynamics (cf Concluding remark (II) in
section X in [11]).
(vii) One should also take into account the recent ontic breakthrough
theorem of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph [36], which has made a great splash
in quantum foundations [37], [38] (perhaps see also my unpublished essay
on historical background to the breakthrough [39]). It can be viewed to
give support to the Everettian many-worlds relative-state interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Here are the own words of the authors (near the end of
their article).
”Finally, what are the consequences if we simply accept both the assump-
tions and the conclusion of the theorem? If the quantum state is a physical
property of a system then quantum collapse must correspond to a problem-
atic and poorly defined physical process. If there is no collapse, on the other
hand, then after a measurement takes place the joint quantum state of the
system and measuring apparatus is entangled and contains a component cor-
responding to each possible macroscopic measurement outcome. This would
be unproblematic if the quantum state merely reflected a lack of information
about which outcome occurred. However, if the quantum state is a physical
property of the system and apparatus, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
each macroscopically different component has a direct counterpart in reality.”
(viii) Quantum Mechanics needs to heal its almost a century long wound
called the paradox of measurement theory. It cannot perpetuate completing
premeasurement by some form of empirical information - like von Neumann’s
ad hoc projection postulate (”process 1”) or Bohr’s arbitrary invoking clas-
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sical physics - because this would not be ’healing’ the wound; it would be
’living with it’ as it is done so far.
Quantum Mechanics seems to be at the crossroads. It can take one of
the following two ’roads’. It can go beyond the unitary formalism, as do
different interpretations (some of them presented in this volume), or it can
remain within unitary dynamics and accept an Everettian many-worlds in-
terpretation [4], [8], [9].
The latter is ”extravagant” according to one of the deepest thinkers in
quantum foundations, the late John Stuart Bell. I would add that the many-
worlds interpretation is disquieting, frightening, appalling; but it still can be
the right ’road’ to take.
A long time ago earth was believed to be the center of the universe (fol-
lowing Ptolemy). Can we imagine what amazement and confusion it was
for the people of that time to imagine earth as one of the numerous moving
celestial bodies (after Copernicus)?
Our descendants may find the idea of belonging to one of the many worlds
as natural as we find the motion of the earth. They will then most likely
have a well developed quantum intuition and perhaps they will wonder in
astonishment why was the idea of parallel worlds mind-boggling for us.
Appenix A. Elements of unitary premeasurement theory
To begin with, the basic assumptions are shortly sketched and the nota-
tion is explained.
The subsystem that is measured is denoted by A. It is assumed that an
observable OA =
∑
k okE
k
A with a finite or infinite purely discrete spectrum
{ok : ∀k} is given in unique spectral form (by ”uniqueness” is meant the
fact that there is no repetition in the eigenvalues in the spectral form). Each
eigenvalue ok can be arbitrarily degenerate.
The measuring instrument is denoted as subsystem B. The measurement
results are expressed in terms of the ’pointer positions’, i. e., the eigen-
projectors F kB of the pointer observable PB =
∑
k pkF
k
B , which is ac-
companied by the completeness relation
∑
k F
k
B = IB , where IB is the
identity operator for subsystem B. The premeasurement process starts at an
initial moment ti , when an initial pure state (state vector) | φ〉
i
A and
the pure initial (or ’ready-to-measure’) state | φ〉iB of the instrument are
given. The interaction between object and apparatus is incorporated in the
unitary evolution operator UAB ≡ UAB(tf − ti) , which brings about the
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final (composite) state
|Φ〉fAB ≡ UAB
(
|φ〉iA |φ〉
i
B
)
. (A.1)
Premeasurement is defined [1] by the calibration condition demanding
that whenever it is statistically certain that the initial state | φA〉i has a
sharp value ok¯ of the measured observable, then it must be statistically
certain that the final composite state |Φ〉fAB has the corresponding sharp
value pk¯ of the pointer observable. (By ”corresponding” is meant ”having
the same value of the index k”, cf the two spectral forms above.) One can
write this as
E k¯A |φ〉
i
A =|φ〉
i
A ⇒ F
k¯
B |Φ〉
f
AB =|Φ〉
f
AB
(cf relations (5) and (6) in [11]). The symbol ”⇒” denotes logical implication.
We are interested in premeasurement theory that is confined to discrete
ordinary observables. (For more general observables see [1].) The calibra-
tion condition is equivalent to the so-called probability reproducibility
condition for them, which requires the equality of the predicted probability
of the eigenvalues of the measured observable in any initial state |φ〉iA and
that of the corresponding ’pointer positions’ in the final composite state (1):
∀ |φ〉iA, ∀k : 〈φ |
i
A E
k
A |φ〉
i
A=〈Φ |
f
AB F
k
B |Φ〉
f
AB. (A.2)
We will need also a third equivalent dynamical definition of premea-
surement , which reads:
∀ |φ〉iA, ∀k : F
k
BUAB
(
|φ〉iA |φ〉
i
B
)
= UABE
k
A
(
|φ〉iA |φ〉
i
B
)
. (A.3)
Equivalence of the dynamical condition and the calibration condition is
proved in [12].
Since
∑
k F
k
B = IB and ||F
k
B | Φ〉
f
AB|| =
(
〈Φ |fAB F
k
B | Φ〉
f
AB
)1/2
, the
probability reproducibility condition (2) implies the decomposition
|Φ〉fAB =
∑
k
(〈φ |iA E
k
A |φ〉
i
A)
1/2 ×
(
F kB |Φ〉
f
AB
/
||F kB |Φ〉
f
AB||
)
(A.4a)
valid for every |φ〉iA ∈ HA .
Expansion (A.4a) displays a connection between premeasurement
and complete measurement. Namely, the LHS of (A.4a) is the final state
25
of premeasurement of the given observable OA =
∑
k okE
k
A , whereas each
term of the RHS of (A.4a) applies to one complete measurement.
One should note that the complete-measurement final states
∀k, 〈φ |iA E
k
A |φ〉
i
A > 0 : F
k
B |Φ〉
f
AB
/
||F kB |Φ〉
f
AB|| (A.4b)
are based on the tacit assumption of minimal premeasurement [40], i.
e., lack of any overmeasurement is assumed. The latter would be the case
if a finer observable, of which the measured observable OA is a non-trivial
function, were measured implying the premeasurement of OA (cf section
V in [11]).
The dynamical definition (A.3) implies that only the k-th initial
component EkA |φ〉
i
A of the initial state |φ〉
i
A =
∑
k E
k
A |φ〉
i
A (decomposition
due to
∑
k E
k
A = IA ) contributes to the k-th final complete-measurement
component in the unitary evolution of premeasurement :
∀ |φ〉iA ∈ HA, ∀k : F
k
B |Φ〉
f
AB = UAB
(
EkA |φ〉
i
A⊗ |φ〉
i
B
)
. (A.5)
Relation (A.5) is actually (A.3) rewritten.
Claim (A.5) is relevant for complete measurement of the observable OA
in which the result ok is obtained because, as it was stated, this process
ends in the state F kB |Φ〉
f
AB
/
||F kB |Φ〉
f
AB|| .
The simplest premeasurement is ideal premeasurement. It can be
defined in three equivalent ways:
(I)
∀ |φ〉iA ∈ HA : |Φ〉
f
AB =
∑
k
(EkA |φ〉
i
A)⊗ |φ〉
k
B, (A.6a)
where {|φ〉kB : ∀k} is, in general, an ortho-normal eigen-sub-basis of PB
in HB : ∀k : F kB |φ〉
k
B =|φ〉
k
B .
(II) The definition that ensues may be called that of Lu¨der’s change-of
-state. It says that that the general final state ρfA of the object in ideal
premeasurement of an observable OA
(
=
∑
k okE
k
A
)
is given by:
∀ |φ〉iA : ρ
f
A ≡ trB
(
|Φ〉fAB〈Φ |
f
AB
)
=
∑
k
EkA |φ〉
i
A〈φ |
i
A E
k
A. (A.6b)
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(III) The third definition reads: Every initial state that has a sharp value
of the measured observable does not change at all in ideal premeasurement :
|φ〉iA = E
k¯
A |φ〉
i
A ⇒ ρ
f
A =|φ〉
i
A〈φ |
i
A . (A.6c)
An in-circle proof of the claimed equivalences is given in [11] (section VII
there).
Finally, we shall make use of a general auxiliary claim, which will be
referred to as the ’under-the-partial-trace commutativity’. It reads:
ZA ≡ trB
(
YBXAB
)
= trB
(
XABYB
)
, (A.7)
where YB and XAB are arbitrary subsystem and composite-system op-
erators respectively. (Under the partial trace, by YB is denoted actually
IA ⊗ YB .) It is straightforward to prove the general claim (A.7).
Appendix B. Proof of equivalence of partial-scalar product and
partial-trace
We now prove the following equivalence (relation (7)):
|φ〉A = 〈φ |B|Ψ〉AB
/
[〈Ψ |AB (|φ〉B〈φ |B) |Ψ〉AB]
1/2 ⇔
|φ〉A〈φ |A= trB[(|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB)(|φ〉B〈φ |B)]
/
{tr[(|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB)(|φ〉B〈φ |B)]}. (B.1)
(Naturally, the implication ”⇐” is ’up to an arbitrary phase factor’.)
Let us start assuming that |φ〉A is given by the partial-scalar-product
relation:
|φ〉A〈φ |A=
(
〈φ |B|Ψ〉AB
)(
〈Ψ |AB|φ〉B
)/
(
〈Ψ |AB (IA⊗ |φ〉B〈φ |B) |Ψ〉AB
)
. (B.2)
First we evaluate the operator NA that is the nominator on the RHS of
(B.2) utilizing two arbitrary complete orthonormal bases in the tensor-factor
spaces {| i〉A : ∀i}, {|n〉B : ∀n} .
〈i|A NA |i
′〉A =
(∑
n
〈φ|B|n〉B〈i|A 〈n|B|Ψ〉AB
)
×
(∑
n′
〈Ψ|AB|i
′〉A |n
′〉B〈n
′|B|φ〉B
)
.
(B.3)
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On the other hand, if we evaluate the operator N ′A that is the nominator
on the RHS of the partial-trace relation (B.1) in the same two bases, we
obtain
〈i|A N
′
A |i
′〉A =
∑
n
∑
n′
〈i|A 〈n|B|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ|AB|i
′〉A |n
′〉B〈n
′|B|φ〉B〈φ|B|n〉B. (B.4)
Obviously, the terms on the RHS of (B.3) and (B.4) are equal (product
of the same four numbers in different order). Hence, NA = N ′A .
Next, we turn to the numbers that are the denominators D and D′
of the partial-scalar product relation (B.2) and the partial-trace relations on
the RHS of (B.1) respectively , and we ascertain of their equality.
D =
∑
i,n,i′,n′
〈Ψ |AB| i〉A |n〉B〈i |A 〈n |B
(
IA⊗ |φ〉B〈φ |B
)
| i′〉A |n
′〉B〈i
′ |A 〈n
′ |B|Ψ〉AB =
∑
i,n,i′,n′
〈Ψ |AB| i〉A |n〉B × δi,i′×
〈n |B|φ〉B × 〈φ |B|n
′〉B × 〈i
′ |A 〈n
′ |B|Ψ〉AB. (B.5)
On the other hand we have
D′ =
∑
i,n,i′,n′
〈i |A 〈n |B|Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB| i〉A |n
′〉B〈n
′ |B|φ〉B〈φ |B|n〉B. (B.6)
Again we can see that the corresponding terms in (B.5) and (B.6) coin-
cide when we take into account the Kronecker symbol in the former and we
exchange the mute indices n and n′ in the latter. This concludes the
proof of (B.1).
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Appendix C. Complete ideal measurement in a general state
As it is well known, ideal premeasurement cannot be, in general, per-
formed in direct premeasurement (cf last passage in section VII. in [11]).
This might seem to cast doubt on the significance of relation (8).
However, it was shown [12] that any general premeasurement of a subsys-
tem event PB in any pure composite-system state |Ψ〉AB has the same
effect on the opposite subsystem A as ideal premeasurement , which is:
ρ
(Psi)
A ≡ trB
(
PB |Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB PB
)/
[
tr
(
PB |Ψ〉AB〈Ψ |AB PB
)]
(C.1)
(cf (33b) in [11]). One should note that the composite-system state (density
operator) under the partial trace on RHS(C.1) is the state of those individual
systems on which PB did occur (on some it did not).
Let ρAB be an arbitrary (mixed or pure) composite-system state (den-
sity operator), and let
ρAB =
K∑
k=1
wk |Ψ〉
k
AB〈Ψ |
k
AB (C.2)
be a decomposition of the LHS into pure states. It is always possible. (A
well-known way is the eigen-decomposition.)
I believe that Everett has followed Bohr in endowing the pure quantum
state with twofold physical meaning: that of an ensemble of equally prepared
systems and that of the individual systems making up the ensemble. This
stipulation is made also in this study.
Since the premeasurement process of PB in an ensemble described by
ρAB takes place on each individual system in the ensemble, and the ensemble
is a mixture of pure states, clearly, it is true also for a general state that any
premeasurement of PB gives rise to the same state on subsystem A as ideal
premeasurement of PB . (One may consider the claim for a pure state as
the ’folded’ version, and that for a general state as the ’unfolded’ version
because the generalization is unique.)
All we have to do is to find out how ideal premeasurement of PB changes
ρAB . Then the reduced density operator is the sought state of subsystem
A. We have to find out how the statistical weights wk have to be modified
when one takes into account the fact that the event PB does not occur on
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all individual systems in the ensemble.
Let us turn to the standard physical meaning of mixtures.
The physical meaning of (C.2) is that it determines a possible manner of
preparation of an ensemble of quantum systems in the state ρAB : One has
to take a sequence of integers
Nk, k = 1, 2, . . . , K (C.3)
such that, defining N ≡
∑K
k=1Nk , one has lim(Nk)→∞Nk/N = wk, k =
1, 2, . . . , K . Then one prepares Nk systems in the state | Ψ 〉kAB for
each value of k to obtain a sub-ensemble that represents empirically and
ensemblewise this pure state. The union of all these subensembles is then the
ensemble representing empirically ρAB (cf (C.2)). It consists of the N
quantum systems.
One should note that in the limit the proportions N1 : N2 : . . . : NK
become equal to the proportions w1 : w2 : . . . : wK (and thus (C.3) deter-
mines the statistical weights wk in (C.2), the sum of which is normalized
to 1).
When an event PB is measured on each of the Nk physical systems
in the state |Ψ〉AB , on some of the states the result 1 will be obtained
(the event ’occurs’), let their number be N ′k . On N
′′
k
(
= Nk −N ′k
)
the
result 0 is obtained (’non-occurrence’).
Thus, for each k value, each of the N ′k individual-system states
(|Ψ〉′AB)
k(〈Ψ |′AB)
k ≡ (PB |Ψ〉
k
AB〈Ψ |
k
AB PB
)/
[
tr
(
|Ψ〉kAB〈Ψ |
k
AB PB
)]
(C.4a)
gives rise to a relative state
(ρ′A)
k ≡ trB[(|Ψ〉
′
AB)
k(〈Ψ |′AB)
k] (C.4b)
for subsystem A (cf (8)).
Let us denote by p′k the relation N
′
k/Nk . When Nk tends to infinity,
p′k tends to the probability 〈Ψ|
k
AB PB |Ψ〉
k
AB (as we know fom the statistical
interpretation of probability):
∀k : p′k = 〈Ψ |
k
AB PB |Ψ〉
k
AB. (C.5)
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When the event PB has occurred, the relative frequencies are
N ′k
/∑
k′
N ′k′ = Nkp
′
k
/∑
k′
Nk′p
′
k′ =
(Nk/N)p
′
k
/∑
k′
[(Nk′/N)p
′
k′]. (C.6)
When all Nk tend to infinity, then, taking into account (C.5), we obtain
the new statistical weights w′k as the limit value of the last expression in
(C.6):
w′k = wk ×
(
〈Ψ |kAB PB |Ψ〉
k
AB
)/
[∑
k′
wk′
(
〈Ψ |k
′
AB PB |Ψ〉
k′
AB
)]
.
When we replace here
(
〈Ψ |qAB PB |Ψ〉
q
AB
)
, by the equivalent trace expres-
sion tr
[(
|Ψ〉qAB〈Ψ |
q
AB
)
PB
]
, q = k, k′ , then we obtain
∀k : w′k = wk × tr
[(
|Ψ〉kAB〈Ψ |
k
AB
)
PB
]
×
{∑
k′
wk′ × tr
[(
|Ψ〉k
′
AB〈Ψ |
k′
AB
)
PB
]}
−1
.
In view of (C.2), this gives
∀k : w′k = wk × tr
[(
|Ψ〉kAB〈Ψ |
k
AB
)
PB
]
×
[∑
k′
tr
(
ρABPB
)]
−1
. (C.7)
Denoting by ρA the state of subsystem A that comes about when PB
is measured ideally in the general state ρAB (cf (C.2) and (C4b)), we have
ρA =
∑
k
w′k(ρ
′
A)
k.
Substituting here w′k from (C.7) and (ρ
′
A)
k from (C.4b) and (C.4a), we
finally obtain
ρA = trB
(
ρABPB
)/[
tr
(
ρABPB
)]
. (C.8a)
This is equivalent to (cf (AUX-c) and (AUX-d) in section 4)
ρA = trB
(
PBρABPB
)/[
tr
(
PBρABPB
)]
(C.8b)
as it was claimed .
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